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CHANGING THE PREMISE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REMEDIES:
THE UNFOUNDED ADOPTION OF
ASSURANCES AND GUARANTEES
OF NON-REPETITION
Scott M. Sullivan*
Marbury v. Madison forever changed the way legal academics
and practitioners viewed the powers of the U.S. federal judiciary. The
International Court of Justice (!CJ), in its recent LaGrand decision,
has challenged other international institutions as well as individual
nations through a M arbury -esque unilateral declaration it hopes will
similarly affect its power and efficacy in the context of international
law and relations with states.
This article examines the rise and ultimate !CJ acceptance of
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition as a fundamental shift
from well-established remedial norms of restitution and repair to a
paradigm of prospective relief How does this change affect current
notions of proper international action within the domestic realm?
Further, what effects will this shift have on state action and legal
legitimacy?
After thorough analysis, the article contends that the unfounded
acceptance of this new prospective relief taints both international in
stitutions and legal principles. The presence of this taint-coupled
with the serious legal and political implications of the implementation
of this potentially harsh prospective remedy-impedes rather than fa
cilitates the progression and efficacy of international law.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2001, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced a deci
sion that prompted an international public discussion because of its bearing
on America's use of the death penalty, the merit of provisional measures, and
the latent tension between two allied world powers. The state of Arizona's
execution of a German national despite the frantic cries of his government
and the gentle prodding of federal officials merged the politically-charged
debate on capital punishment into a full frontal assault on consular relations
generally, and the efficacy of the International Court of Justice specifically.
The Court responded to this perceived assault in its LaGrand (Germany v.
United States) judgment of June 2001 . 1 Newspaper headlines proclaimed that
the Court's judgment elevated the level of respect for international law and

1

LaGrand Case (F.R.G.

v.

U.S.), I.CJ. (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/

icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus_ijudgment_200l0625.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
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represented world condemnation of the American death penalty.2 Undoubt
edly, the debate stirred by La.Grand on these issues will continue and public
intellectuals and legal academics will scrupulously examine the Court's judg
ment. 3 However, the most revolutionary consequence of La.Grand is its dras
tic implication for remedial powers of courts applying international law-an
implication at which the world media has not raised an eyebrow.
International law is based on the creation of obligations among states,
but does not traditionally address how such obligations should be met and
administered on a national level, within domestic laws.4 The introduction of
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition (AGNRs) as a tool of interna
tional courts not only infuses international law with the ability to directly
instruct effects within national law, but vests this profound power in judicial
institutions unsuited for the task.
The La.Grand judgment changes the dynamic of international law in a
manner similar to the way the United States Supreme Court delineated its
power to strike down federal legislation in Marbury

v.

Madison:5 quietly and

surreptitiously. In LaGrand, the ICJ embraces a new legal remedy, court
issued AGNRs, without examining their legal basis or providing guidance for
application. Moreover, LaGrand duplicates Marbury's tactics by declining
to exercise the new remedy in a way that would trigger vigorous state protest.
This article argues that AGNRs do not fit the mainstream conception of
customary international law, nor are they valid under more expansive theo
ries. Through interdependent reasoning and process, the ICJ and the Interna
tional Law Commission (ILC) joined forces to create new law that neglects
both the principles of customary international law and the practicality and
theory of state compliance. This formation leaves AGNRs with no legitimate
legal foundation and extends the power base of international law-tradition
ally limited to the remedial restoration of harms-into the active anticipation
and prevention of future violations.

2

Further, the artificial elevation of

See Peter Finn, World Court Rebukes U.S. Over Execution of Germans, WASH. PosT, June 28,

2001, at A20; Imre Karacs, U.S. Found Guilty of Flouting Law on Death Penalty Laws, THE INDE
PENDENT (LONDON), June 28, 2001, at 16; Press Release, Amnesty International, The USA Must

Obey International Court Decision on Prisoners' Rights (June 28, 2001) (on file with author).
3

This is especially true in the relationship to the binding nature of provisional measures, a widely

debated issue in legal academia. In contrast, due to U.S. federalism and unwillingness to sign
human rights treaties, the issue of condemnation of the death penalty is more likely to elicit interest
among non-lawyers rather than mark a new era of jurisprudence in the area of capital punishment.
4

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common

Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815, 819 (1997); see generally Loms
HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: CAsEs and MATERIAL 153 (3d ed. 1993).
5

Marbury

v.

Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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AGNRs undermines the ICJ's and ILC's legitimacy, fracturing the backbone
upon which the international legal system relies for compliance.

This harm

is accentuated by the bodies' insufficient guidance on the application of
AGNRs, resulting in impossibly large applicability and no evidence of reme
dial efficiency.
Section I of this article examines the significance of AGNRs in their
historical context and the recent ICJ judgment in LaGrand.

It explains the

meaning of AGNRs both historically and under the new legal framework
established by the ILC and ICJ, respectively. Additionally, it discusses both
theoretical and practical applications of these meanings.
Section II analyzes the artificial elevation of AGNRs from a discrete
diplomatic practice to a potentially large-scale remedy wielded by interna
tional courts. It demonstrates the court-ordered AGNRs' unsubstantiated re
liance on the foundation of "progressive development," insufficient historical
precedent, and inappropriate ties to the cessation of present harms.
Section III critiques the new prominence of AGNRs and illustrates how
the ILC and ICJ stood on each other's shoulders in advocating a legal remedy
unsupported by law.
Finally, Section IV addresses the multiple problems created by the ICJ's
adoption of AGNRs. First, there are practical problems relating to the broad
language used by the court, which may result in indeterminacy and boundless
application. This underscores the Court's failure to clearly articulate the use
of AGNRs in a given pattern of facts, including those of LaGrand. Further,
Section IV examines how the Court's decision in LaGrand compromises the
legal principle of AGNRs, the institutional integrity of the ICJ, and compli
ance with international law generally.

I.

THE HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ASSURANCES AND GUARANTEES
OF NoN-REPETITION (AGNRs)
The practice of diplomatic AGNRs has been present in the world of

international relations since the 19th century and continues to the present
day. Diplomatically, the practice is straightforward. One nation notifies an
other that it believes a current practice violates a tenet of international law.

In addition to the cessation of that violation, if it is a continuing one, the non
infringing state would ask the infringing state for a promise that the activity
will not happen again or for a specific action that would actively reduce the
likelihood of another violation. For example, in 1901, in response to pres
sure from Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire made a formal assurance that
British postal services would be able to operate freely in its territory. During
the Boer War (1899-1900), Germany requested Britain to issue instructions
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to its Navy not to molest German merchant ships outside recognized war
zones in accordance with the customary international law of prize.6 Of these
practices, the Ottoman assurance of free movement within its empire is akin
to an "assurance of non-repetition" (ANR), while the issuance of instructions
to the British navy by the government regarding policy toward German
merchants would be considered a "guarantee of non-repetition" (GNR).
More recently, in 1986 Afghanistan called for the issuance of AGNRs
when it made a diplomatic request to the United States and "other imperialist
powers" asking them to create a policy of non-intervention against the So
viet-backed Afghani government. It stated, "The key to the solution is the
total cessation of these interventions and the provision of international guar
antees on their cessation and non-repetition.''7
In 1997, Chechen nationalists, in peace negotiations with the Russian
government, also asked for an AGNR when they insisted through diplomatic
and public channels that for a cease-fire to be effective, Russia must agree to
"a guarantee that there can be no repetition of the solution of controversial
problems by force. "8 The Chechens characterized the conflict with Russia as
a violation of international law and equated such a guarantee as the lynchpin
for securing its independence.9
In both the Afghanistan-U.S. and Chechnya-Russia incidents, the in
fringing parties declined to adhere to the Afghani and Chechnyan requests,
and thus no guarantees were issued.10
Compared to assurances and guarantees issued in the course of diplo
macy, court remedies bearing similarities to AGNRs are few. AGNRs are
not remedies under customary international law because the primary goal of
international dispute resolution is to remedy past wrongs and/or enjoin cur
rent wrongs. In addition, as opposed to a diplomatic assurance or guarantee,
a court ordered AGNR would impose a new legal obligation upon the in
fringing state. The AGNR would require new action that, if not complied
with, would give rise to new legal consequences unrelated to the satisfaction
of the original obligation. The new obligation thus burdens not only the in
fringing state, but also the court that issued the AGNR.

6

See C. JoHN CoLOMBos, A TREATISE ON

THE

LAW OF PRIZE,

§6,

at

7, §§151-154, at 164-67

(1926).
7

Kabul Press Coriference on Partial Withdrawal of Soviet Forces from DRA, BBC SUMMARY of

WoRLD BROADCASTS, Oct.
8

22, 1986.

Top Official Interviewed on Chechen Peace Prospects, First Use of Nuclear Arms, BBC SUM

MARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
9
io

Id.
Id.

May 12, 1997.
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The Trail Smelter case is one of the few examples of the use of mea
sures similar to AGNRs by an international legal tribunal, although it focuses
on a past wrong as opposed to preventive judicial action.11 In the case, the
United States complained that a Canadian mining and smelting company just
north of the U.S. border was polluting the Columbia River valley through
suJfur dioxide emissions.12 The U.S. and Canada engaged in legal arbitration
that resulted in a finding for the U.S. that required Canada to pay compensa
tion. Additionally, the tpbunal mandated that the smelting company must
maintain equipment to measure environmental conditions, including sulfur
dioxide concentration, in areas where the U.S. claimed the pollution was oc
curring.13 The measures were designed to reduce emissions to a level equ al
to or below guidelines set by the tribunal. Equipment readings and resulting
pollution information were ordered to be given to both nations' governments
on a monthly basis and, if levels rose above set guidelines, compensation
could again be awarded to the United States.14

In its codification efforts of state responsibility the ILC defines assur
ances of non-repetition (ANRs) as generally verbal in nature and consisting
of a state's assertion that it will not engage in the prohibited activity in the
future.15 In comparison, guarantees of non-repetition (GNRs) offer a more
substantial commitment and demand more tangible action that manifests in a
change of policy or law, rather than mere verbal assurances. For example,
the infringing state may be forced to commit to preventive measures re
quested by the injured state calculated to reduce the likelihood of a repeat
breach.16

In relationship to the application and role of AGNRs, the ILC

notes that when such a remedy is sought, the primary concern is the "contin
uation and repair of the legal relationship affected by the breach."17 As a
result, the administering court's concern is the future impact of the order in
light of this goal.
When such a remedy is requested by the injured state, it comes in the
form of a request that the violating state implement safeguards or remove
obstacles in the way of attaining compliance. The goal of repairing the legal
relationship is inextricably tied to the inherent concern of repetition. Given
the relationship between the nations, the AGNR may run the spectrum of
11

Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911 (1938).

12

Id. at 1922.
Id. at 1918-19, 1924-33.
Id. at 1934-36.
Report of the International

13

14
15

Law

Commission,

U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 22 I.

U.N. Doc. A/56/ 10 (2001 ) [hereinafter ILC Commentary on State Responsibility].
16
11

Id.
Id.

at 162.
at 216.
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simple verbal assurances to very specific instructions or requirements of con
duct. In the case of ANRs, simple promises of better protection for persons
and property may be sufficient when foreign nationals are concerned. 18
In 2001, the ICJ's adoption of the ILC's interpretation expanded AGNR
use from diplomacy to international courts. As a result, a tool of diplomacy
used to cajole and threaten other states into compliance was transformed into
a legal instrument capable of creating additional binding obligations on states
against their consent.

II.

THE ARTIFICIAL ELEVATION OF ASSURANCES AND
GUARANTEES OF NON-REPETITION

The transformation of AGNRs into legal tools lacks a proper founda
tion. Instead, it relies on doctrinal bootstrapping created by the ILC and
adopted by the ICJ. Two main developments are responsible for this trans
formation: 1) the ILC undertaking of codification of State Responsibility,
and 2) the implicit adoption of the ILC argument for AGNRs by the ICJ in

LaGrand. Both events elevated the power of the ICJ, making it better situ
ated to order remedies that overhaul the traditional structure of international
responsibilities. This section examines the ILC codification work and ICJ
judgment in

LaGrand as they evolved separately, became intertwined, and

played key roles in bootstrapping the power of legal remedies in customary
international law.
A.

International Law Commission: Its Authority and the Codification of
State Responsibility Doctrine
The ILC derives its influential power over codification through its

founding resolution passed by the 1947 General Assembly pursuant to Arti
cle 13(l)(a) of the UN Charter. 19 Under the process of codification, the ILC
claims as successes its work in the creation of the Law of the Sea Conven
tions of 1958, the Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, the Conven
tion on Consular Relations of 1963, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 1969, and the Convention for the Protection of Diplomats of
1973.20 Since 1973, the ILC continued its work with less effect. In the in18

S ee ILC Commentary on State Responsibility, supra note 15.

19

This part of the UN Charter empowers the General Assembly to make recommendations pro

moting international cooperation, progressive development of international law, and the codification
of international law. Much of this language is essentially repeated in the statute creating the ILC.
U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. l (a).
20

Gerhard Hafner, The International Law Commission and the Future Codification of Interna

tional law, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 671, 671 (1996).
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terim, the Convention on the Representation of States and two conventions
on State Succession took place with neither entering into force. 21 More re
cently, the ILC prepared and adopted a Draft Code of Crimes against the
Peace and Security of Mankind22 that was ultimately eclipsed by the frame
work of the Rome Statute that formulated the International Criminal Court
(ICC).23
The statute creating the ILC also empowered it with the ability to pursue
"progressive development" of international law.24 This schism of responsibil
ity between codification and "progressive development" reflects the deep di
vide between those who desired the ILC to be a neutral body, with the
primary task of piecing together the current state of law, and those who re
garded it as a more politically charged body working to push law forward to
embrace emerging trends.25 Ultimately, the UN bridged the divide by nar
rowing its definition of codification, while allowing the ILC to cast progres
sive movements into "draft conventions" that reflect its perception of modem
trends within the law.26 The Committee defined "codification" as "the more
precise formulation and systemization of rules of international law in fields
where there already has been extensive state practice, precedent and doc
trine."27 They outlined "progressive development" as "the preparation of
draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by interna
tional l�w or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently devel
oped in the practice of States."28 Despite the attempt to delineate and thus
separate the two areas of responsibility, legal commentators, as well as the

21 Id.
22 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International
I.aw Commission on Its Forty-eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 5lst Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 9, U.N.
Doc. A/5 1/10 ( 1996).
2j Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 1 83/9 ( 1996) available
at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute.
24 G.A. Res. 1 5 1 , 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 45, at 214- 15, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977)

(ILC

formed for "the promotion of progressive development of international law and its codification");

Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 1 74(Il),

art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).

25 Report of the Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codifi
cation, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 2nd Sess., Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/AC.10/5 1 ( 1 947). See also

Herbert W. Briggs,

THE lNTERNATIONAL LAw CoMMisSION 129-41 ( 1 965).

26 Rosemary Rayfuse, The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind:
Eating Disorders at the International Law Commission, 8 CRIM. L.F. 43, 79 ( 1 997).
27 Statute of the International Law Commission, art. XVII, U.N. Doc. A/CN.414 (2002) available
at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/statufra.htm.
2s Id. at art. XV.
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ILC itself, have gauged it too difficult to completely separate codification
and "progressive development."29
Despite continued protest among states about the mixing of "progressive
development" of new law and codification of existing practice, the ILC' s
conventional practice reveals that its goals have been mixed, with a substan
tial portion of its codification efforts being guided by its view of "progressive
development."30 Notably, ILC work under the auspices of the Code of
Crimes against the codification-driven Peace and Security of Mankind also
resulted in draft rules for an international criminal court inspired by progres
sive development.31
The UN General Assembly first declared elements of state responsibility
as proper work for the ILC in 1949. In its first manifestation, the ILC ad
dressed a narrow segment of state responsibility regarding injuries to
aliens.32 This small-scale approach was ultimately rejected with the appoint
ment of Roberto Ago as special rapporteur who directed a more comprehen
sive set of work. Ago expanded the project to encompass a clarification of
the underlying framework for state responsibility without any discussion of
the substantive rules that would trigger its protocol. Ago believed the crea
tion of the articles should adhere to a strict distinction between "the princi
ples which govern the responsibility . . . for internationally wrongful acts"
and "the task of defining rules that place [original] obligations on States, the
violation of which may generate responsibility."33 In essence, the articles of
state responsibility were designed to create a structure of norms to clarify
when an internationally wrongful act has occurred and what the legal conse
quences of that act may be. These norms culminate in the remedial structure
to be applied, including satisfaction, reparations, and countermeasures.
Part of the remedial structure created by the ILC focuses on the diplo
matic use of AGNRs in resolving disputes. The state responsibility article
dealing with AGNRs was the only new remedial structure, the very existence

29

Report of the International law Commission to the General Assembly, [ 1 956) 2 Y.B. Int'l L.

Comm'n 255, U.N. Doc. N3 159.
30

State protest is evident in multiple documents solicited by the ILC in which governments out

line comments and observances on ILC projects; see B. Graefrath, The International law Commis

sion Tomorrow: Improving its Organizatio n and Methods of Work, 85 AM. J. INT'L. L. 595 ( 1 991)
(discussing the role of progressive development in the current codification effort).
31

This type of progressive development work i s necessary when creating new institutions like

an

international criminal court. James Crawford, The /LC Adopts a Statute for an International Crimi

nal Court, 89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 404, 405 ( 1 995).
32 U.N. CoomcATION of STATE REsPONSIBil.JTY (Maria Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1 987).
33

Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, [ 1 970] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 306, U.N.

Doc. N80 1 0/REV. l .
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of which in customary international law was questioned.34 Its inclusion as
Article 30 of the ILC ' s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted in November of 2001 ,35 moved it
from a distinct diplomatic practice into a proposed part of customary interna
tional law.36 The wording is as follows:
Article 30
Cessation and non-repetition.
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an
obligation:
(a) To cease that act, if it is continuing;
(b) To offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repeti
tion, if circumstances so require.37

B.

The International Court of Justice: Limits of Power and its Decision
in LaGrand
The ICJ S tatute empowers the Court to apply international conventions

that establish rules of customary international law, general principles of law,
treaties and the often criticized provision of writings of the "most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the deter
minati on of rules of law."38 Additionally, the Court is empowered to act as
the international tribunal to resolve disputes when explicitly assigned that
task by treaty. When deciding a case under a relevant treaty, the Court is
empowered to consider both the remedies included in the treaty and those
under general customary international law.

While ICJ judgments are not

granted binding status through doctrinal precedent, they are de facto binding
because they prescribe the legal principles on which a case stands.39 Thus, if
a similar case were to arise, it is likely that the ICJ would recognize the same
principles and rule in a similar manner. The ruling would be further facili-

34

See State Responsibility: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, Interna

tional Law Commission, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/488 (1998).
35

The article including AGNRs was included in previous drafts by the ILC and was actually

argued as part of a different draft in the LaGrand case. The ILC had substantial discussions related
to the placement of AGNRs in the Draft Articles, and, most significantly, whether it should be
coupled with cessation or not. Comments Received by Governments, International Law Commis
sion, 53d Sess., at 36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515 (2001).
36

Christian J. Tams, Consular Assistance and Rights and Remedies: Comments on the /Cl's

Judgment in the laGrand Case (2001) available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/curdevs/sr24.html.
37

ILC Commentary on State Responsibility, supra note I 5, at

38

Statute of the International Court of Justice, 2002 S.I.C.J. art. 38, available at http://www.icj

216.

cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm#CHAPTER _II
39

Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade law, 14 AM. U. lNT'L. L.

REV. 845, 921 (1999).
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tated by the logical ease of malting two consistent judgments. If not included
in customary international law, the Court may not decide a dispute or assign
a remedy not included in the treaty. Properly summarized,
The International Court is not a legislative body established to formulate
new rules of law. In a sense this is stating the obvious. Nevertheless,
confusion persists. The Court, like all courts, applies the existing law. It
does not 'create' new rules of law either for the parties to a given dispute
or for the international community at large.40

The issue of ensuring that the Court acts within the confines of its
ascribed judicial function has been substantially explored in assessing the
latitude of its power to give advisory opinions. In contrast to AGNRs, the
ICJ Statute does grant the Court power to give advisory opinions.41 Despite
this explicit delineation, it was argued in the Nuclear Weapons Case42 that 1)
limitations in the UN Charter restrict the Security Council's ability to seek an
advisory opinion, and 2) an advisory opinion would require the Court to en
gage in policymaking akin to legislation in order to issue a coherent judg
ment.43 The Court rejected these arguments and, in determining the scope for
its decision, held that issuing an opinion on the legality of threatening the use
of or using nuclear weapons was within its judicial purview. The Court de
fended the legality of its advisory opinion, stating, "the Court must identify
the existing principles and rules, interpret them and apply them to the threat
or use of nuclear weapons, thus offering a reply to the question posed based
on law."44 As to the charge that such a judgment would amount to legisla
tion, the Court held:
It is clear that the Court cannot legislate, and, in the circumstances of the
present case, it is not called upon to do so. Rather its task is to engage in
its normal judicial function of ascertaining the existence or otherwise of
legal principles and rules applicable to the threat or use of nuclear weap
ons. The contention that the giving of an answer to the question posed
would require the Court to legislate is based on a supposition that the
pre.sent corpus juris is devoid of relevant rules in this matter. The Court
could not accede to this argument; it states the existing law and does not
legislate. This is so even if, in stating and applying the law, the Court
necessarily has to specify its scope and sometimes note its general
trend.45

40

SHABTAI RosENNE, THE WoRLD CouRT: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 38 (5th ed. 1 995).

41

Statute of the International Court of Justice, 2002 S.I.C.J. art. 65-66.

-12

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. 226 (July 8).

·B Id.
44 Id. at 234.
-15 Id. at 237.
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The Court's statement demonstrates that as recently as 1996, its juris
prudence recognized that the purpose of the ICJ is to examine the corpus

juris relative to the question presented and apply the appropriate body of law.
In doing so, it is appropriate for the Court to note the apparent direction of
the body of law, but until the trend has reached the point of incorporation in
relevant corpus juris , it remains non-binding dicta. Under customary inter
national law, corpus juris includes current practices of states that may poten
tially be hardening into customary international law and precludes the
predilections of international law scholars' opinions of where the law should
be.

The adherence to established corpus juris has been accepted through

numerous judicial decisions from the inception of the ICJ.46 In Haya de la

Torre, an asylum case, the Court held that it lacked the ability to guide Co
lumbia in its compliance with an earlier Court judgment.47 The Court ex
plained its holding as follows:
Having thus defined in accordance with the Havana Convention, the legal
relations between the Parties with regard to the matters referred to it, the
Court has completed its t ask. It is unable to give any practical advice as
to the various courses which might be followed with a view toward termi
nating the asylum, since, by doing so, it would depart from its judi cial
function.48

This doctrine is based on a belief that substantial intervention by the ICJ into
national affairs may violate sovereignty and promote the possibility of back
lash against other international institutions.
tions lose

respect for

the

designated

Such a backlash, in which na

international

institutions,

would

ultimately lead to their demise as it did with the ICJ's predecessor, the Per
manent Court of International Justice prior to World War II.
Before LaGrand, the ICJ limited itself to assigning remedies under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) and/or customary inter
national law. Germany, in its Fourth Submission to the Court, asked the ICJ
to require the United States to give it a guarantee of non-repetition.

The

Court's decision on this matter cemented ILC Article 30.
The facts of the case were as follows: Karl and Walter LaGrand were
two German nationals who had resided in the United States since their arrival
as young children in 1967.49 On January 7, 1982, they were arrested in Ari
zona for involvement in an attempted bank robbery in Marana, Arizona. In
46 The Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia

(South West Africa), Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.CJ. 31, 57
(June 12).
41 Haya de la Torre (Colum. v. Peru), 1951 l.C.J. 71, 83 (June 13).
48 Id.
49 Arizona

v.

LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987).
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the course of the robbery, one bank employee was murdered and another
seriou sly injured. In 1984, both were convicted of first-degree murder, at
tempted murder, attempted armed robbery, and two counts of kidnapping.50
The death sentence was imposed on both men 11 months later. The case
proceeded to the Supreme Court of Arizona, which denied post-conviction
relief in January 1987. Another petition for post-conviction relief was denied
in state court, and was upheld by the Supreme Court of Arizona in 1990 and
the United States Supreme Court in 1991.51
The LaGrands were not properly informed of their relevant rights under
the VCCR at any time during conviction, sentencing, and the first set of
appeal s.5 2 Similarly, none of the proper authorities informed the German
consulate of the charges facing the LaGrand brothers or of their imminent
sentencing. 53 Instead, the LaGrands were inf ormed of the r ight to consular
assistance by a third party and informed the German consulate of their situa
tion in June 1992. 54
In 1995, the LaGrands sought to have their convictions and sentences
set aside in federal district court based, among other things, on the fact that
U.S. authorities, in violation of the VCCR, failed to notify the German con
sulate of their arrest. The petition was denied by the federal court, which
found that the argument based on the U.S. violation of the VCCR was proce
durally barred due to failure to raise the claim in Arizona state court. ss The
U.S. Court of Appeal s for the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the decision
on January 16, 1998.56
The Supreme Court of Arizona scheduled the execution of

Karl

LaGrand on Febr uary 24 and the execution of Walter LaGrand on the March

3. Karl LaGrand's final federal appeals were denied and he was executed as
scheduled.57 The day before the scheduled execution of Walter LaGrand,
Germany sought the ICJ' s intervention by asking for interim protection pend
ing the consideration of the case before the Court. Germany's petition was
granted and the ICJ issued an interim measure asking the U.S. government to
50

Id.

51

State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563 (Ariz. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987).

52

Jennifer Lynne Weinman, The Clash Between U.S. Criminal Procedure and the Vienna Con

vemion on Consular Relations: An Analysis of the International Court of Justice Decision in the

LaGrand Case, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 857, 859 (2002).
53 Id. at 867.
54

Id.

55

LaGrand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999).

56

Id.

57

William J. Aceves, International Decision: LaGrand (Germany v. United States), 96 A.J.I.L.

210, 210 (2002).
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"take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not exe
cuted pending the final decision in these proceedings."58 Despite the interim
order, Walter LaGrand was executed.59

In the ultimate proceedings in the International Court of Justice, the
U.S. argued primarily that AGNRs are not an acceptable remedy to be con
sidered by the ICJ under international law. 6° Further, to the extent the Court
might find an AGNR attractive, the U.S. had already gone to great lengths to
reduce the likelihood that a similar violation would occur in the future.61
Included in these efforts were the mass production of guidance pamphlets for
law enforcement, training programs, and potential punishment for law en
forcement that did not follow Vienna Convention guidelines. In support of
the original claim for a GNR and the revised request of an ANR, the German
government argued that AGNRs were recently embraced by the ILC Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, U.S. repetition was a realistic possibility,
and the executed defendants suffered too severe a harm to be solved solely
by an apology. 62
In its judgment, the ICJ tentatively sided with Germany, noting that, "an
apology is not sufficient in this case," or in any other case where Vienna
Convention rights are infringed resulting in "prolonged detention or ... se
vere penalties."63 In making its pronouncement, the court did not clearly ex
plain its justification for using AGNRs under customary international law.
Instead, it simply declared that in a case with risk of repetition present, an
apology does not provide an appropriate remedy.64

m.

A CRITIQUE OF LAGRAND: THE EFFECT OF

THE

RISE OF AGNRs

Customary international law imposes obligations on states but does not
specify how those obligations shall be met within the domestic realm. Inter
national courts are empowered to find violations of international law and

58

Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.CJ.

Order of Provisional Measures para. 29 (Mar. 3).
59

The World in Brief,

60

LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Oral Pleadings paras. 5.1-.43, 7.1-.15 (Nov. 14, 2000, at

WASH. PosT, March 4, 1999, at Al6.

3 p.m.), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idockeUigus/iguscr/igus_icr2000-29.html (last visited Jan.
22, 2003).
61

Id. at paras. 7.16-.27.

62 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v.

U.S.), l.C.J. Oral Pleadings (Nov. 16, 2000), available at http://

www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguscr/igus_icr2000-30.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
63 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v.

U.S.), I.CJ. para. 123 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj

cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgmenUigus_ijudgment_20010625.htm
2003).
64 Id.
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Jan.
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remedy them, but the LaGrand decision, by embracing the ILC Article 30 on
AGNRs, opens the door to changing this doctrine and does so with no legal
foundation.
The previous section set out the two pillars of justification for AGNRs:
the ILC codification of state responsibility and the ICJ judgment in

LaGrand.

This section explores the fragility of those pill ars, demonstr ating that the
only foundation for the actions of each institution is the legitimacy of the
other. Both the ILC and ICJ are required to take account of and, to different
degrees, base their work on existing customary international law to ensure
legitimacy. However, the only basis the ICJ uses in finding AGNRs as a
legitimate remedy is the ILC codification of state responsibility, while the
basis for codification of AGNRs in Article 30 is the ICJ decision in
LaGrand. The result is a fatally flawed foundation that undercuts AGNR
viability and is harmful to the legitimacy of international law. Further, the
formulation set out in

La.Grand, again based on Article 30 of the ILC Draft

Articles on State Responsibility, provides very little guidance and results in a
system that is both counterproductive to its stated goals and poorly allocates
resources. In setting out these arguments, I consider the foundations relied
upon by both the ILC and ICJ and discuss the weaknesses of those
foundations.

A.

The International La.w Commission 's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility
The ILC Articles on State Responsibility "seek to formulate, by way of

codification and progressive development, the basic rules of international law
concerning the responsibility of States for their internationally wrongful
acts."65 The traditional account of customary international law holds that a
principle reaches customary international law status through a two-part pro
cess: fir st, via widespread and uniform state practice, which, secondly, be
comes ul timatel y regarded by states as having the binding force of law (often
referred to as

opinio juris) .66 The notion of opinio juris attempts to decipher

the motivation of the state in its decision to recognize a principle as a re
quirement under international law. The principle "hardens" into part of cus
tomary i nternational law when there is a finding that the nation believed it
was bound to follow the principle as a notion of law.67 This formulation is
based in the

North Sea Continental Shelf cases where the ICJ, in discussing

65

ILC Commentary on State Responsibility, supra note 15, at 59.

66

R EST ATEM ENT

67

Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Cm. L.

(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (1986).

REV. 1 1 1 3 , 1116-17 (1999).
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whether an Article of the 1 95 8 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
had become customary international law, said that in order for it to have
attained such status it would "be necessary that the provision concerned
should, at all events potentially, be of a fundamentally norm-creating charac
ter such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of l aw . " 6 8
In this case, the Court recognized the reciprocal n ature of international obli
gations as key to the resolution of conflict and creation of international law.
There does not exist, however, enough state use of AGNRs to consider
them customary international law or as part of an emerging trend in the law.
To the extent that the state practice element is fulfilled, it is unlikely that
nations have begun to view the imposition of AGNRs as binding customary
international law.

There is also no modem trend that would j ustify court

usage of AGNRs under the ILC' s mandate of progressive development.
While the ILC can consider the progressive movement of international
law, its standard for assessing progressive development has been finding
modem trends in the law, not open ended political goals.69 The ILC is not
required to differentiate proposals it considers "progressive development,"
but often does so to counter arguments that portions of its work are not sup
ported by customary international law.70 In the case of AGNRs, if the ILC
had shielded such work as part of its progressive development mandate, it
would have weakened its argument of prior widespread ratification of
AGNRs by abandoning the binding legal n ature of customary international
law found in codification.71 The ICJ would not have been able to apply
AGNRs as a recognized remedy without explicit state consent in a treaty .

68

North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.) (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1 969 I.CJ. 3 (Feb. 20).

69

Generally, "progressive development" efforts are intended to prod movement of the law and are

not taken from scratch. Ultimately, a goal of the "progressive development" aspect of ILC work is
that the proposals eventually become part of customary international law. See Daniel N. Hylton,
Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ' Inadequate Framework on
Reservations, 27 VANn. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 4 1 9, 447 & n. 1 88 ( 1 994).
10

Article 41 (particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this chapter) and

Article 48 (invocation of responsibility by a State other than an injured State) are the only articles
specifically recognized as derived from progressive development as opposed to codification in the
ILC State Responsibility Articles. U.N. GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at

53, U.N. Doc.N56/ 1 0

(2001); id. at 56.
71

Many governments commented on the large degree of progressive development within the ILC

draft, although not explicitly including Article

30 in their assessment. These countries included:

Austria, France, Ireland, Japan, Mongolia, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the
United States. U.N. GAOR,

56th Sess., Supp. No. 1 8, at 5 1 , U.N. Doc. A/56/ 1 0 (200 1 );

see U.N.

GAOR, International Law Commission, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/488 ( 1 998); see also Com
ments and Observations Received from U.N. GAOR International Law Comm., 50th Sess., U.N.
Doc.

A/CN.4/45 15 ( 1998).
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This is so because if a provision is recognized as a progressive development
it implicitly does not reflect current law ; if not a part of current law, it cannot
be applied without consent. As such, the ICJ does not r ecognize !LC-created
provisions based on "progressive development" as binding law.72 This argu
ment was recognized by the U . S. in oral argument:
While it may be entirely appropriate for the International Law Commis
sion, in fulfillment of its mandate for the progressive development of in
ternational law, to identify obligations that may not be reflections of
current law, it would not be appropriate for this Court to impose such an
obligation on a State appearing before it that has not accepted such an
obligation. 73

Further decisions by the ICJ have tweaked the traditional customary in
terna tional law standard while keeping its formal elements and basic theory
intact. A relevant example is the reduced importance of state practice and
the increased reliance on the Court' s analysis of whether states have acted
due to a sense of lega l obligation. This is demonstrated in the ICJ' s reason
ing that the presence of customary rules "can be tested by induction based on
the analysis of a sufficiently extensive and convincing practice, and not by
deduction from preconceived idea s . "74 Thus, if the state appears to be acting
out of obligation it demonstrates the widespread nature of the practice. 75
Other cases have confirmed this trend by finding the existence of multilateral
treaties and international agreements as nearly dispositive on the existence of
customary international law without examination of actual practice.76
Historically, customary international law has been applied to basic
norms and widely accepted notions of international principles regarding the
law of war and the treatment of aliens. More modern approaches to custom72

Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K.

v.

Ice.), 1974 I.CJ. 3, 22-33 (July 25); on the general issue of ICJ

distaste for judicial adoption of progressive development, see Michael Reisman, Metamorphoses:
Judge Shigeru Oda and the International Court of Justice , 1995 CAN. Y.B.
73

INT'L L. 185.

LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. Oral Pleadings para. 5.19 (Nov. 14, 2000, at 3 p.m.),

available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguscr/igus_icr2000-29.html (last visited

Jan. 22, 2003).
74

Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ.

299 (Oct. 1 2).
75

There is an obvious circularity in this argument. If opinio juris demonstrates practice, practice

would just as probatively demonstrate opinio juris in many cases . This reasoning seems to ignore
the real possibility that States often act out of "courtesy, convenience, and tradition" as noted by the
!CJ in North Sea Continental Shelf. Also if there are evidence problems in finding practice, there
are obviously more problems in ascertaining motive for governmental decisions and whose motiva
tions in the government would be most relevant. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.;
F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.CJ. 3 (Feb. 20).
76

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. US), 1986 I.CJ. 1 4

(June 27).
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ary international law also include human rights norms that have garnered
broad acceptance and which have often been committed to textual instru
ments. More recently, these basic norms that serve as the cornerstone of
customary international law have become more accommodating, with poten
tial extension to government-assured paid holidays as part of customary in
ternational law . 7 7 However, a real assessment of the legitimacy of a practice
under customary international law should examine whether the elements of a
traditional creation of customary international law exist and the impact of
recognizing these new norms. In making this assessment it is important to
critically examine the elements of customary international law formation to
find what satisfies these elements. Ultimately, if AGNRs do not satisfy the
test, then neither the ICJ's nor any other international tribunal' s use of them
is legitimate without explicit reference in the applicable treaty.

In its earlier work, the ILC recognized that while it was interested in
AGNRs as a proper remedy under codification, there existed little customary
international law basis for it. 78 During its discussion of the proposal to codify
AGNRs, commission p articipants noted that while it may not be uncommon
for governments to give assurances of behavior similar to ANRs, it was far
from clear that such a statement could be considered undertaking a legal
consequence related to state responsibility.79 Further, the state practice
seemed to be most dominant in the 19th century and, thus, would be difficult
to characterize as either codification or recognition of the progressive devel
opment of the law.80 The ILC also recognized that there had been no cases
where courts had clearly required AGNRs. 81

In basing the validity of AGNRs on customary international law, the
ILC commentary mentions several instances in which governments or tribu
nals have engaged in diplomatic practice resembling the ILC definition of
AGNRs. Besides the LaGrand case, the ILC mentions the following: a pres
idential speech by Lyndon Johnson demanding the Soviet Union provide ad
equate security for the U . S. embassy in Moscow; the "Dogger Bank" incident
of 1904 where the UK requested "security against . . . recurrence ;" an ex-

77

John 0. McGinnis, A New Agenda for International Human Rights: Economic Freedom. 48

CATH. U. L. REv. 1029, 1 030 (1999).

78 Implicitly, comments within the ILC regarding the lack of state practice or opinio Juris on
AGNRs hints that Article 30 is more "progressive development" than codification. However, since
the ILC included historical examples in its commentaries to Article 30 in an apparent attempt to
j ustify it under customary international law, my analysis wil l continue in that vein.
79 Report of the International Law Commission , V.N. GAOR 52nd Sess., Supp. No.

at 29, U.N. Doc. N55/IO (2000) :
so Id.
81

Id.
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change of notes between China and Indonesia in 1 966 regarding consular
security in Jakarta; a 1901 case where the Ottoman empire made a formal
assurance that certain foreign postal services would oper ate freely in its terri
tory; an incident of seizure of German ships during the Boer war ( 1 899-

1900) where Germany told Britain that it must issue instructions not to seize
German merchant ships not in a war zone; and the "Doane" incident where
assurances against repetition were made in 1 886.82 Additionally, the ILC of
fers a handful of examples from the Human Rights Committee (HRC) where
the HRC has requested repeal or modification to domestic law. 83
However, it should be noted that the historical examples used by the
ILC are not court-issued AGNRs but demonstrate only diplomatic use. The
request of assurances or guarantees by another nation i s appropriate in diplo
macy but does not equal the Article 30 proposal by the ILC that courts wield
such tools as an international remedy. Rather , only numerous examples of
courts issuing remedies very similar to Article 30 AGNRs, and those reme
dies being followed, would suffice to create customary international l aw.
Even if taken as doctrinal reflections of AGNRs, the ILC examples of
diplomatic use of AGNRs do not reveal either sufficient state practice or
evidence of

opinio juris necessary to create customary international law . It

may be common for diplomats to use assurances that a violation will not
occur in the future, or even go so far

as

to change domestic policy, but they

do so for purposes of leveraging in diplomatic relations-not obligation
under law. Rather than demonstrating

opinio juris , such actions more likely

reflect coincidence of interest or coercion.84 The ILC' s examples of the Otto
man Empire assuring operation of the British post and of the "Dogger Bank"
case came at a high point of British imperialist power. The Boer War request
to respect the international law notion of "free ship, free goods" and the em
bassy security dispute between the USSR and the US were between equal
powers w ith the ability and inclination to provide reciprocity. In contrast, the
Afghani request for U.S. assurances of non-intervention and the Chechen
request for Russian non-repetition of internationally wrongful fighting were
not respected because the elements of coincidence of interest or effective
coercion were absent. If

opinio Juris existed in these practices, there would

be several examples of AGNR requests being followed in the absence of
reciprocal interests or coercion.

82

!LC Commentary on State Responsibility, supra note 15, at 2 1 9, 22 1 -22 nn.470-71 and 474-75.

83

Id.

84

See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 67 (an incisive examination of customary international

law principles affected by coincidence of interest or coercion).
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Due to the lack of evidence satisfying the traditional test of customary
international law, the ILC's adoption of its proposed article reg arding
AGNRs was illegitimate. This is because there are serious questions, recog
nized within the ILC, as to whether AGNRs can be considered legal conse
quences of an internationally wrongful act. 85 The ILC's concerns focused on
whether such a remedy could be considered a part of customary international
law and a debate over the efficacy of imposing additional obligations on
nations that could potentially lead to another breach. This secondary breach
would be a breach of a remedy, which would have to be enforced through the
imposition of yet another remedial measure. 8 6 When first considering the
proposal, the ILC passed the issue to the ICJ for reinforcement before adop
tion took place. It did this by suspending adoption of Article 30 until after
the ICJ made

its judgment on Germany' s submission for AGNRs in

LaGrand.87 Following the ICJ decision, Article 30 was accepted in the final
form of the draft articles.

B.

The International Court of Justice 's Decision in LaGrand
In La.Grand, the ICJ, by embracing the ILC argument for recognition of

AGNRs as part of customary international law, goes beyond past jurispru
dence and the limitations set out in its founding statute. In order to rule on
Germany' s fourth submission requesting ANRs, the ICJ first looked to find
this power under the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations (VCCR) Op
tional Protocol. 88 The absence of any particular provision in the VCCR or

any other major treaty regarding AGNRs as viable judicial remedies means
that if the use of AGNRs were to be legitimate, it must receive its legitimacy
through customary international law. The ICJ found the necessary jurisdic
tion in La.Grand by relying on a general rule that in the absence of explicit
language on the subject of remedies, the Court is empowered w ith the ability
to decide such issues under customary international law. 89 In its assessment
85

James Crawford, Jacqueline Peel & Simon Olleson, The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of

States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Completion of the Second Reading, 1 2 EuR. J. INT' L L.

963 (2001).
86

This second concern was crystallized by Special Rapporte ur Crawford in his assessment that it

would be difficult to impose sanctions based on a breach of failure to provide AGNRs when so
ordered. See James Crawford, Special Rapporte ur, Third Report of the on State Responsibility,
International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR 52nd Sess., at 26 para. 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/507
(2000) [hereinafter Third Special Rapporteur Report].
87 Tams, supra note 36, at n.81.
88

LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), l.C.J. paras. 46-48 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj

cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus_ijudgment_20010625.htm
2003).
89

Id. at paras. 35-63.
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of customary international law, the court relied on Germany' s argument that
the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility should be a guide.
The Court found a difference between AGNRs and mere actions de
signed to prevent breaches90 by stating that a general effort to avoid a breach
is a "general assurance of non-repetition," and as such did not satisfy Ger
many's request for a

specific assurance of non-repetition of the procedural

errors leading to the execution of the LaGrand brothers.91 The ICJ made this
distinction by finding that the U.S. declarations showing a desire to comply
in the future were different than specific measures enacted to actively prevent
such breaches. Thus, declarations of willingness to comply could satisfy
general assurances of non-repetition but would not constitute a more specific
guarantee.92 While denying Germany ' s original submission of a specific as
surance or guarantee of non-repetition, the court concluded that the U.S . was
required to "allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sen
tence by talcing account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Conven
tion. This obligation can be carried out in various ways."93
As the

La.Grand case progressed, Germany changed its original written

submission for specific guarantees of non-repetition into a less controversial,
but theoretically similar demand for assurances of non-repetition, which was
then argued orally in front of the court.94 The German argument advocating
the use of AGNRs closely mirrored the development of the proposal within
the ILC framework. First, it was noted in general argument that the ILC
changed the classification of AGNRs from remedial to preventive remedies
and, thus, equated them with requests for cessation:
[W]ith regard to assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, the propos
als made by the Drafting Committee effected a certain change: while the
draft adopted at first reading referred in Article 46 to such guarantees as
one particular form of reparation, the guarantees are now combined to
gether in draft Article 30 with the duty of the responsible State to cease
its breaches. In doing so, the Drafting Committee followed the view of
Special Rapporteur James Crawford, and others, that assurances and guar
antees of non-repetition perform a distinct and autonomous function; they

90

The U.S. argued that its efforts to ensure compliance (pamphlets, education, etc.) should be

seen as appropriate satisfaction for Germany.
9 1 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. para. 1 24 (June 27, 2001 ), available at http://www.icj
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus_ijudgment_2001 0625.htm
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2003). See also Tams, supra note 36, at 17.
92 See LaGrand Case, supra note 9 1 , at para. 1 24.

93 Id. at para. 1 25.
94 Notably, the oral argument for Germany on its demand for assurances of non-repetition was
made by Bruno Simma, an accompli shed international law scholar, and, unsurprisingly, a member
of the ILC.
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are future-oriented and serve a preventive rather than a remedial
purpose. 95
This argument warrants two observations. First, it distinguishes the
change made from the written pleadings, which depended on Article 46 (the
predecessor to Article 30). In arguing for the use of the ILC draft as a basis
for legal legitimacy, Germany had to make note of this change. Otherwise it
would have been irrelevant to note that it was not coupled with cessation.
This is cemented in the further comment that this change in the draft actual1y
provides legal grounding for the proposition of AGNRs by tying them to
cessation. In fact, Professor Simma, arguing for Germany, cites this argu
ment as the "legal foundation [of AGNRs] which was accepted by the Inter
national Law Commission."96 Pursuant to this reasoning, if cessation is

a

legally accepted principle, then under Germany' s argument, AGNRs ought to
be considered part of cessation and thus part of customary international law.
However, while members of the ILC certainly did believe that coupling
the ideas together was more theoretically coherent, there appear to be few
other customary ties between the two notions. Cessation may relate to future
activity so far as the international wrong is continuing, but the concept of
AGNRs extends beyond not only the actual facts of the case, but beyond the
parties in litigation. This is supported by the ILC 's commentaries that ex
plain that cessation specifically applies to "continuing" wrongful acts.97 In
contrast, AGNRs extend into factual situations not considered at the time of
their issuance and circumstances that have not yet taken place.
Germany asserted that AGNRs are "firmly anchored in international
law," but failed to provide any argument that the elements of customary in
ternational law were satisfied. Instead, Germany remarked that "[i]t is re
markable to see how [the ILC's] proposal to expressly restate assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition as a distinct consequence of breaches of interna
tional law adopted by the ILC, was quickly followed by State practice."98
This statement was backed by citing one case before the ICJ,99 an amicable

95 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. Oral Pleadings sec. VIII para. 10 (Nov. 13, 2000, at 3

p.m.), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icj www/id ocket/igus/iguscr/igus_icr2000-27.h tml (last
visited Jan. 22, 2003).
96

Id. at sec. VII para. 22.

97

ILC Commentary on State Responsibility, supra note 15, at 221.

98

LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. Oral Pleadings sec. VIIl para. 23 (Nov. 13, 2000, at 3

p.m.), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguscr/igus_icr2000-27.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2003).
99

Id. (citing Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.CJ. 7, 12, 16, 17 (Sept.

25)).
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settlement before the European Court of Human Rights , 1 00 and a list o f cases
decided in front of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 1 0 1 Germany
concluded by noting that "neither in their comments on the ILC draft articles
adopted at first reading in 1996, nor in the recent Sixth Committee debates,
[did] any government [suggest] the deletion of the draft article embodying
our assurances and guarantees." 1 02
By neglecting even to attempt to find foundation for AGNRs in custom
ary international law, Germany failed to provide the ICJ with any valid basis
for embracing the controversial remedy.

Instead Germany hung its entire

case for AGNRs on the ILC' s Article 30 proposal.

The fact that govern

ments have subsequently utilized ILC proposals to bolster their cases and
acquire actions of other governments does not give legal validity to AGNRs
but instead demonstrates the opposite-that they were not a true part of state
practice prior to ILC codification, nor were they considered part of interna
tional law. If they had been so considered, why would governments just now
start to seek them in front of international tribunals?
Similarly, the argument that governments had not requested the deletion
of Article 30 is both irrelevant and misleading. The fact that a body like the
Sixth Committee does not actively object to a specific portion of a draft arti
cles does not mean that it either ascribes to the reasoning used by the ILC in
justifying the article or that it thinks that it is part of customary international
law. The Sixth Committee and General Assembly are not required to follow
customary international law. They may believe that the policy behind
AGNRs is wise and thus that it should be a part of state responsibility. How
ever, that does not mean that they think such policy is part of customary
international law, or that they are required to investigate the legal status of
AGNRs. Instead, that function is for international courts like the ICJ and, to
a

more limited extent, bodies like the ILC. Therefore, the opinion of the

Sixth Committee is generally irrelevant in assessing whether a proposal is

consistent with customary international law. Additionally, Germany's argu
ment that the Sixth Committee' s silence implies consent is rejected by inter
national law. In the issue of reservations to treaties, bodies like the Human
Righ t s Committee have held that the failure of countries to object to a partic
ular reservation does not equal acquiescence to that position, much less advo
cacy of it. 1 03 Also, the purpose of receiving comments and observations from
100 ld.
(citing Denmark v. Turkey, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 8-10 para. 2 1 (2000)).
1 0 1 Id. (citing Castillo Petrnzzi et al.,
Case 52, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 222, ser. C (1999); Tamayo,
Case 42, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 1 64, ser. C (1998)).
102 Id.
103

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights and Conditional Consent, 149

U. PA. L. REV. 399, 436 (2000).
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governments is not to have them examine if each provision properly reflects
customary international law.

The governments, while encouraged to give

feedback, are not the crafters of the draft articles as they would be in the case
of a treaty. Governments may have had a myriad of reasons for commenting
or remaining silent that had nothing to do with their opinion of AGNRs as
part of customary international law.
Second, there have been several expressions of doubt about the validity
of AGNRs. In 1998, Germany noted in its comments to the ILC regarding
then Article 46 (which included AGNRs), that, "[s]ome doubt exists . . . as to
whether the injured State has, under customary international law, the right to
'guarantees of non-repetition' . . . .

To impose an obligation to guarantee

non-repetition in all cases would certainly go beyond what State practice
deems to be appropriate."104 In the same report, Uzbekistan commented that
the article on AGNRs should assess what types of AGNRs a state could be
entitled to obtain. 105 In the next compilation of comments from governments
regarding the Draft Articles of State Responsibility the United States advo
cated deletion of the AGNRs section, "as it reflects neither customary inter
national law nor State practice ." 106
Although not explicitly relied upon in La,Grand, a classic argument in
favor of application of AGNRs is that they essentially do not ask the violat
ing state to do anything that they did not agree to do in the first place and
that, as a result, they are amenable to customary international law and an
assessment of the burden that this obligation would entail was already ac
cepted by the state before the issuance of an AGNR. This argument fail s to
recognize the forward-looking obligation-imposing nature of AGNRs and the
degree of specificity necessary to be effective. Unlike cessation, AGNRs do
not deal with stopping a continuing violation of international law, but rather
force prospective changes within domestic law in order to avoid the possibil

ity of a future violation. This change from repairing past harms to avoiding
future ones is likely to be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It is over
inclusive because, although not mandated in La,Grand, under the ILC frame
work an effective AGNR could easily result in a mandated change under
domestic law that is neutral on its face, but may nevertheless result in a
violation of international law. For example, in La.Grand a procedural default
104 State Responsibility: Comments and Observations Received from Governments , U.N. GAOR,

International Law Commission, 50th Sess., at 103, U.N. Doc. NCN.4/448 ( 1 998) available at http:/
/www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/50/doclist.htm.
!OS

Id. at 1 13.

1 06 State Responsibility: Comments and Observations Received from Governments , U.N. GAOR,

International Law Commission, 53d Sess., at 36, U.N. Doc. NCN.41515 (2001) available at http://
www .un.org/law/ilc/sessions/53/53docs.htm.
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(failure to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the lack of consular notifica
tion) precluded re-trial of the LaGrand brothers. Obviously, a repeal of the
procedural default doctrine leading to this preclusion would be drastically
over-inclusive-many people not covered by the VCCR would be able to use
the changed law to their advantage.
Additionally, requiring a change in procedural default by changing legal
definitions of "cause" or "prejudice" would also not ensure that violations of
this kind would not occur in the future. In

LaGrand, a more relaxed defini

tion of "cause" or an elimination of the "prejudice" standard would have
resulted in a different outcome. However, in its judgment, the ICJ simply

consider the violations of the right
guarantee a particular result from that consider

noted that national courts are required to
to consular assistance, not to

ation. 107 Under this rule, it is still possible for national courts to read the
requirements of procedural default as to make the impact of such an assess
ment negligible. If this were done, the state would likely still be in violation
of Article 36 of the VCCR. As a result, the ICJ would need to continue to
monitor and mold any AGNR to ensure that the order fit comfortably with
the obligations of the treaty within the application of domestic law.
The Court ' s finding that the U . S . was required to allow review and re
consideration and that an apology was not enough seems to be a tentative
endorsement of the view that AGNRs are a stronger remedy than mere cessa
tion. In ruling that the

LaGrand case represented a situation of a severe

penalty and that such a penalty could not be remedied by mere apologies, the
Court appears to be assessing the "nature of the obligation and breach" as
recommended by the ILC. In so doing, it is saying that in run-of-the-mill
cases of violation of the Vienna Convention, AGNRs may not be an appro
priate remedy, but in the case of a "serious" breach, the Court may require a
more specific AGNR (although it declined to do so in
In summary, with the

LaGrand).

LaGrand judgment, the ICJ utilized the legal basis

concocted by the ILC in making its decision on Germany' s Fourth Submis
sion regarding AGNRs. What the Court failed to do was to provide any
guidance or commentary about how such orders will or should be utilized in
the future. This lack of guidance, coupled with reliance on the work of the
ILC for the legal establishment of AGNRs leaves an open question regarding
how such a potentially far-reaching remedial measure should be used. This
burden is even greater since the traditional markers of customary interna
tional law are not present.
1 07 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.CJ. para. 91 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj
cij.org/icj www/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus_ijudgment_200 1 0625.htm
2003).
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IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF AGNR A DOPTION UNDER THE

ILC/ICJ

FRAMEWORK! THE TAINT OF ILLEGITIMACY
WITH No RoAD MAP

The lack of guiding instructions in the ICJ judgment creates an addi
tional obstacle to any potential benefits from devices designed to avoid the
breach of international obligations.

In this section I examine the difficu lt

problems presented by the unwillingness of the ICJ to create clearer guide
lines for future application of its powerful new tool.
The adoption of AGNRs leads to substantial problems with legitimacy
and taints the institutions that elevated it.

I examine the negative conse

quences of AGNR adoption by reviewing its relation to international legal
compliance in both vertical and horizontal legal structures.

Legal thought

regarding legitimacy as an instrument for attaining heightened efficacy and
compliance of international law can be used as a lens through which to view
the adoption of AGN Rs . 1 08 I conclude that poor policy and illegitimate adop
tion of AGNRs will lead to less effective international institutions and legal
rules.

A.

!LC Guidance for Application
The ILC draft Articles of State Responsibility make it clear that AGNRs

are not always appropriate. They also offer very little other guidance as

to

the circumstances that would be appropriate for their use. The ILC commen
tary explaining their application notes :
[A]ssurances and guarantees of non-repetition will not always b e appro
priate, even if demanded. Much will depend on the circumstances of the
case, including the nature of the obligation and of the breach. The rather
exceptional character of the measures is indicated by the words "if the
circumstances so require" at the end of subparagraph (b ). The obligation
of the responsible State with respect to [AGNRs] is formulated in flexible
terms in order to prevent the kinds of abusive or excessive claims which
characterized some demands for assurances and guarantees by States in
the past. 1 09

The commentary notes factors that must be considered when determin
ing whether to apply AGNRs, including, "when appropriate," the "nature of
the obligation and of the breach,'' and "if the circumstances so require." This
language is not particularly clear, but surrounding language indicates that the
108 In particular the scholarship of Thomas Franck,

Koh, infra

infra

notes 121 and 125, and Harold Hongju

note 1 1 5, on the subject. To a lesser extent, the work of Lewis Henkin, infra note l I 6,

and from the realm of international relations, the research by the Chayes,'

109 Id. at 165.

infra note 1 28.
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ILC intended that AGNRs be used to combat repetitive breach and avoid
irreparable harms, both of which are damaging to international relationships
between states. 1 1 0
Most noticeably absent from the ILC ' s analysis i s any explicit reference
to the burden imposed on the infringing state in order to carry out requested
AGNRs. 1 1 1 The ILC formulation of AGNRs to aid in the reparation of the
states' legal relationship focuses solely on the impact on future infringement.
The burden of implementing an AGNR could be enormous, especially when
judicially crafted, even when the legal relationship between the parties on
any given issue is only mildly damaged. Even worse, enforcement burdens
could result in the reluctance of the infringing state to take part in interna
tional treaties that may subject it to AGNRs in the future. 1 12
International treaties, and international law generally, are largely based
on a consent model that allows for parties to agree to international obliga
tions willingly and withhold consent from agreements they find objectiona
ble. Any implementation of AGNRs has the potential to upset the delicate
balance inherent in the consent-based model.

While limited infringement

would most likely be tolerated in circumstances where its costs were substan
tially lower than the costs associated with fighting it, the more substantial the
infringements would engender more distrust and distaste for the process.
More importantly, unwise AGNR use would result in an additional interna
tional obligation without consented to and could potentially cost a state sub
stantial political capital, economic resources or both. As for poorer nations,
the lack of language taking into account the burden imposed is likely to pro
mote their belief that their limited financial needs are not being considered.
Moreover, these burdens pose disproportionate negative effects on poor na
tions. In contrast, wealthier nations are in a better position to shirk any addi
tional obl igations imposed under the rubric of AGNRs because no clear
enforcement mechanism or even formulation of theoretical consequences of
breaking AGNRs exists. As to this problem of consequences, Special Rap
porteur James Crawford noted
It may be asked what the consequences of a breach of that ob ligatio n
[of

AGNRs] might be. For example, could a State which had tendered

full reparation for a breach be liable for countermeasures because of its
1 10

Third Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 86, at 26.

111

The word "explicit" is used because it is conceivable that the ILC intended to give some

weight to this factor in its "nature of the obligation and the breach" language.

Theoretically, one

could argue that an incredible burden makes compliance difficult, if not impossible and thus would
make non-repetition similarly difficult-thus affecting the "nature of the obligation and breach."
1 12

The U.S. reluctance to fully enter into many international agreements can already be traced to

the type of domestic influence of international courts that AGNRs would tend to promote.
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failure to give assurances and guarantees against repetition sati sfactory to
the injured State? It does not seem very likely. 1 13

B.

Historical Use
Given the ICJ' s failure to effectively explicate the characteristics of ap

propriate use, historical use of AGNRs is important as a potential guide. Un
fortunately, as noted above, the historical basis of court-issued AGNRs is
difficult to ascertain. Although it is also clear that verbal assurances are in
dispensable tools of international negotiations, there have been few clear
documented examples.

They are generally seen as being requested when

"restoration of the pre-existing situatio n does not protect (the injured State)
enough." 1 14 Essentially, the AGNRs requested in historical diplomatic prac
tice were efforts to allow the restoration of the international relationship be
tween two states.
There are very limited examples of the utilization of AGNRs in the legal
arena. Among these is a case heard before the European Court of Human
Rights, Denmark

v.

Turkey, in which Turkey agreed in a friendly settlement

that its police would engage in an international program of training . 1 1 5 Simi
larly, in the Castillo Petrua.i case before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACHR), the IACHR found the government of Peru in violation of
human rights aspects of the American Convention. 1 16 In Castillo Petruzzi,
the defendant was convicted by a military tribunal of treason and sentenced
to life imprisonment. 1 17 In its judgment, the IACHR denounced the use of
"faceless" military tribunals as a violation of the American Convention.
Such tribunals were violations of an impartial trial guaranteed under Article
8. 1 of the American Convention because the very

arm

of the government

charged with combating terrorism was used in assessing its detainees ' guilt
or innocence. n s Further, Peru was found in violation of other portions of the
American convention in its treatment of the prisoners prior to their trial . 1 1 9 In
its finding that the nati on's actions were violations, the IACHR affirmed ear1 1 3 Third Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 86, at 26 para. 58.
1 1 4 Id. at 162.
m

See Denmark v. Turkey, 2000-IV Eur Ct. H.R. 1, 8-1 0 para. 21 (2000).
.

1l6 Castillo Petruzzi et al., Case 52, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 93, ser. C (1999). Additional charges
of violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations were originally brou ght but either
dismissed as moot or disposed of in preliminary objections, id. , and thus, not dealt with thoroughly
in the final judgment.
117 Id. para. l .
1 18 Id. para. 125 & 130.

1 1 9 Examples of the other violations of the treaty were Article 5 (conditions of confinement) and
Article 7.5 (30 day detention without judicial hearing insufficiently prompt).
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lier case law declaring that Peru needed "to adopt such measures as may be
necessary to ensure that violations such as those established in the instance
case never again occur in its jurisdiction. " 1 20 While not going into specific
details as to the "necessary" measures, the Court followed its declaration in
relation to the American Convention stating that Peru, "is to adopt the appro
priate measures to amend those laws and ensure the enjoyment of the rights
recognized in the Convention to all persons within its jurisdiction, without
exception. " 1 2 1 At the very least this would require the domestic reform of
some of its anti-terrorism legislation that authorizes the kind of military
tribunals utilized in Castillo Petruzzi.

Conceivably, it would also involve

substantial overhaul of legal procedures and aspects of the prison system that
were also deemed violations. In response to the j udgment by the IACHR,
Peru made known its intention to immediately withdraw from the jurisdiction
of the IACHR. 1 22 Apparently this was an attempt to avoid prospective judg
ments against the state and avoid any legal reform implicated by the Court's
ruling. 123 The Court held that Peru' s withdrawal was ineffective and that the
IACHR would continue to rule on cases brought against it. The Court ruled
that the only way to avoid jurisdiction by the Court was to withdraw from the
entirety of the American Convention or at the very least give substantial no
tice before withdrawal would take effecr. 124
There is at least one overriding lesson in the application of AGNRs that
can be derived from cases such as Trail Smelter and Castillo Petruzzi

that

-

the assessment of the burden should be a clear factor in determining whether
AGNRs should be applied. In Castillo Petruzzi , the IACHR was undoubt
edly correct in its assessment that the actions of the Peruvian government
went beyond the limits intended by the American Convention.

Unfortu

nately, the remedy of the Court requiring reformation of all laws that could
lead to the repetition of the violation was both breathtakingly broad and inva
sive. This may not have been the sole factor affecting Peru' s decision to
withdraw from the Court's j urisdiction (and potentially the American Con
vention), but it was certainly an aggravating factor.

In order to faithfully

comply with the Court's order, the Peruvian government would have been
forced to begin a substantial change of its laws and compromise what it
viewed as a noble effort to eradicate terrorist threats to both the government
and its people.
1 2°
121
1 22

Castillo Petruzzi et al., Case 52, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 93, ser. C ( 1 999).

Id.
D ouglass Cassell, Peru Withdraws from the Court: Will the Inter-American Human Rights

System Meet the Challenge?, 20 HuM. RTS. L.J. 1 67, 168-69 ( 1 999).
1 2 3 fd. at 1 68 n. 10.
124

fvcher Bronstein , Case 54, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 40, ser. C ( 1 999).
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The Trail Smelter case involved a more limited and specific set of
AGNRs that dealt with an important, but not security-driven, issue. The bur
den of requiring a company to compile statistics and share them with both the
Canadian and U . S . governments may involve a somewhat untraditional in
fringement on a nati on ' s conception of sovereignty, but is unlikely to create
substantial costs to the government in either financial resources or political
capital. Compared to the IACHR' s action, it is much more subtle and less
invasive, and can be ascribed to the goal of maintaining a legal relationship.
The Trail Smelter remedy was also easier to comprehend, enact, and accept
because it dealt with a much more tangible problem that was fairly easily
addressed. The problem was the amount of contamination produced by one
actor, thus, only one major actor necessarily was involved in remedying the
problem. The legal problem created by the Trail Smelter AGNR might have
been in it being too specific, and thus not leaving the method of compliance
to the violating government. This aspect of it was likely remedied by the fact
that it was a relatively minor infringement into sovereignty . 125 In contrast,
the Castillo Petruzzi order that all actions should be taken to avoid violation
in the future would require an overhaul of national security measures .
Ultimately, the codification effort appears to have ceded the idea o f pro
viding any guiding language as to when the use of AGNRs would be "appro
priate, " leaving international j udicial bodies free to find situations where
"circumstances so require" AGNR implementation. This was made clear by
Crawford' s note that "there must be serious doubt as to whether any form of
words could give much guidance in advance of the assurances or guarantees
appropriate in any given case. "126
In LaGrand, the ICJ never addresses these difficult issues of applica
tion. The court does not specify the content of the duty or its implications
within the confines of the LaGrand case, or beyond. 1 27 The result is indeter
minacy for states, lessened respect for the principle of AGNRs the Court is
attempting to establish, and heightened concerns over the Court ' s legitimate
purpose and confidence in its judgment as a whole.

125 Relatively minor requirements like those levied in Trail Smelter are exactly the type of small
"chip ping away" actions that international institutions de facto are able to exerc ise to advance their
goals. The cost of fighting such a minor infringement largely exceeds the costs of acquiescing.
126 Third Special Rap porteur Report, supra note 86, at 26 para. 59.
127 See Christian J. Tams, Recognizing Guarantees and Assurances of Non-Repetition: LaGrand

and the Law of State Responsibility, 27 YALE J. lNT'L L. 441, 442 (2002) .
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Illegitimacy as Hindrance to Development of AGNRs and as Taint to
International Institutions
The result of the ICJ' s doctrinal aggrandizement of AGNRs is two-fold.

First, specifically relating to their embrace as a remedy of the future, AGNRs
could serve as a powerful weapon in directly influencing specific state prac
tices within domestic law. Secondly, the illegitimacy of this new weapon,
created by of j udicial activism, could just as easily indicate a greater sphere
of power acquired by the ICJ as erode the foundation of consent by nations
and undermining the Court' s current power.
The impact of the La.Grand decision on international remedies specifi
cally, and international law generally, will ultimately be determined by its
efficacy in making international law more powerful and responsive to chang
ing needs.

As described earlier, the perceived benefit of the adoption of

AGNRs is to "modify the traditional idea that the rules of state responsibility
are mainly concerned with the reparation of wrongs between injured and re
sponsible state, and the restoration of the status quo ante ." 12 8 AGNRs re
present the ICJ's willingness to enter into a forward-looking approach to
future compliance with international law. In assessing whether such compli
ance will follow, it becomes necessary to undertake an examination of why
nations comply with international law.
1.

Theories of Compliance in International Law

Numerous theories attempt to explain why states comply with interna
tional law.1 2 9 The compliance question haunts all areas of international law
because its resolution affects the framework of law to maximize efficiency
and predictability. Among the theories, Louis Henkin, Thomas Franck, and
Harold Hongju Koh, have provided the paradigms most generally adhered to
relative to this important question. Henkin' s assertion that "almost all na
tions observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their
obligations almost all of the time" 1 30 sets the background for an assessment
of why some principles are not respected and what their non-compliance
means.
Henkin declared that compliance resulted from a cost/benefit analysis
that consistently favored international legal compliance. Decisions of non
compliance could either be traced to an unusual non-rational act or a clear,
128

Tams. supra note 36, at 22.

1 29

See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599

( 1 997)

(an intensive study relating to the development of legal theory surrounding international

legal compliance tracing this development from classical times to present).
130

Lorns HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE

47

(2d ed.

1979).
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important advantage perceived by the nation in breaching its international
obligation. 1 31 The potential advantage assessed based on an examination of
numerous factors relating to the effects of compliance in both foreign affairs
and domestic policy. 1 32 While not explicitly tying this cost/benefit analysis to
legitimacy, some of the Henkin factors are substantially related to the legiti
macy of the international obligation in question. The factor of a nation's
desire to possess a reputation for principled behavior 1 33 is directly affected
by the obligation's legitimacy.

Should the obligation be widely considered

as illegitimately created, noncompliance is unlikely to engender scorn from
other nations. Additionally, this reasoning mirrors the factors used in assess
ing whether there has been "internal acceptance." 1 34
Thomas Franck expounded on the Henkin puzzle of international com
pliance absent effective enforcement in The Power of Legitimacy Among Na
tions

.

135 Franck tied Henkin's observation of dependence on voluntary

compliance and deliberative creation of international institutions and norms
to the value of legitimacy within the institution that caused compliance.
Franck defined legitimacy as "a property of a rule or rule-making institution
which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively
because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right
process." 1 36 The very nature of international law as a voluntary system re
quires a high o f institutional and procedural legitimacy. In assessing a rule ' s
legitimacy, and thus i t s compliance-inducing power, Franck identified four
major factors: determinacy, validation and creation by appropriate processes,
conceptual coherence, and conformity with the organized hierarchy of the
rule system.137 Franck argued that international obligations and rules were
respected because nations "perceive the rule and its institutional penumbra to
have a high degree of legitimacy." 1 38 Should rule or institutional legitimacy
decrease, voluntary compliance would suffer in correlation. The results are
"black holes i n the normative fabric [of international law] . . . due to a lack of
legitimacy of the rules and institutional processes by which they are made,
1 3 1 Id. at 49.
1 32 Id. at 49-53, 60-68.
133 Id. at 50-52.
1 34 Id. at 60-68 (demonstrated by delineation of habit imitation and governmental structures
within compliance). Henkin's internal acceptance factor is a precursor to recent work by Koh out
lined within.

135 THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS ( 1 990).
1 36 Id. at 24.
137 Id. ; see also Koh, supra note 129, at 2628.
1 38 FRANCK, supra note 1 3 5 , at 25.
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interpreted and applied."139 Just as a black hole digests all light and matter
that venture too close, many other rules and institutions suffer from the taint
of illegitimacy emanating from another area of the law.
Koh builds on the work of Franck and others to add an additional ele
ment in explaining compliance, that of "norm internalization" through trans
national process. 140 Koh argues that the external creation of the international
principle is important, as argued by Franck, but what cements state obedience
is the internalization of that norm in the domestic realm. This internalization
results from a "transnational process" of debate and adoption within the do
mestic sphere affirming the nation' s commitment to international law within
a domestic plane. 141 Interaction within national institutions results in the in
doctrination of international legal principles within the domestic legal struc
ture. This indoctrination brings to life domestic legal compliance into line
with overall legal compliance.

2.

The Taint of International Rules and Institutional Legitimacy
Resulting from

LaGrand

The ILC and ICJ embrace of AGNRs is vulnerable to charges of illegiti
macy due to the violation of appropriate process and aggrandizement of their
institutional competencies. The result of this illegitimate adoption will be a
weaker World Court and lessened respect for international legal principles
beginning with AGNRs and emanating into the larger atmosphere of interna
tional law. Rigorous analysis, inducing certainty and predictability is instru
mental to reinforcing the veneer of legitimacy of institutions that are largely
dependent on voluntary compliance.142 One commentator noted that thor
ough legal analysis by international courts, "may . . . be necessary to the

l 39 Thomas M. Franck, Why a Quest for Legitimacy?, 21 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 535, 546 ( 1 988).
1 40 Koh, supra note 129, at 2646.
141 Id. at 2646-48. Koh uses the example of the unilateral change of interpretation of the ABM

treaty by the Reagan administration which was ultimately repudiated by Clinton Administration
policy. Id.

This example may be weak given the recent Bush Administration nullification of the

treaty, but the principle, still holds true. The ABM treaty was ultimately rejected by the Bush
admi nistration, in part, precisely because its tenets ultimately were not internalized sufficiently.

1 42 See ABRAM CHAVES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEw SOVEREIGNTY 1 1 8-23 ( 1 995)
(arguing through the paradigm of international relations theory that evidence of international inter
action and validity of legal norms is coordinated through legitimacy). This concern is heightened in
international law where culture variation makes unanimity difficult and concerns over cultural im
perialism is prevalent. In such circumstances, the fulfillment of democratic principles of participa
tion and fair process facilitate perception of the imposed norm as just and valid and avoids state
circumvention. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L .
449, 5 1 8

(2000).
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continued

acceptability

of

the

Court

and

the

effectiveness

of

its

judgments. " 143
Legitimacy concerns are particularly heightened in legal analysis over
the content of customary international law such as in the La,Grand adoption
of AGNRs. The theory of customary international law has consistently been
questioned regarding its methodology and legitimacy. 144 Despite this reality,
the ICJ provides almost no legal analysis as to how its dramatic shift to a
forward-looking remedial structure is based in law. Even proponents of the
doctrinal shift find it "surprising that the court apparently did not feel the
need to elaborate in detail why guarantees and assurances were due, or
whether it was competent to award them . " 1 45 This absence of legal justifica
tion came despite "the paucity of previous state practice supporting such
claims for guarantees and assurances [AGNRs]."146 Instead of providing le
gal analysis regarding the backgroun d of its adoption of AGNRs, the ICJ
created a clear conceptual endorsement of AGNRs to avoid future breach of
international law.
The Court's judgment fails Franck's framework of legitimacy-inducing
compliance. 1 47 The Court, while conceptually embracing a new remedial par
adigm, does not set clear guidelines for its application beyond Vienna Con
vention cases specifically dealing with the death penalty. 1 48 Si milar
circumstances are likely to be particularly rare. However, as the holding de
pends largely on the ILC work in the area of state responsibility, potential
application beyond wGrand 's limited circumstances is certain. Similarly, as
the decision is based in customary international law rather than treaty law,
potential application of AGNRs is breathtakingly broad. This broadness of
its application precludes legal certainty. The resulting indeterminacy makes
it difficult for states to avoid subjecting themselves to this new ICJ power.
Unwittingly being forced to endure such a new remedial structure without
foreseeable standards for application further erodes the respect states will
give to the rule.
143 Jonathan J. Charney, Book Note, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 458, 460 ( 1 995) (reviewing CHRJSTOPHER
R. Rossr, EQUITY
DECISIONMAKING

AND

INTERNATIONAL LAw:

A LEGAL REALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL

( 1 993)).

144 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4; see generally 1. Patrick Kelly, supra note 1 42 (regarding broader legitimacy concerns).
r45

Tams, supra note 127, at

443.

146 Id.
147 The factors, as identified above are determinacy; validation and creation through appropri ate
process; and conformity within organized hierarchy.

148 See Tams, supra

note 127, at 442 (recognizing vagueness in ICJ statement of means to satisfy

the German request for assurances).
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Moreover, the interdependent reasoning of the ICJ and ILC circumvents
the appropriate processes of both institutions, thus compromising the institu
tional legitimacy of both organizations and bastardizing the legal norm cre
ated.

The ILC was created to codify and develop international law; the

necessary mixing of these goals cannot, however, justify muddying legal
principles that are clearly unsupported by traditional sources of law with es
tablished norms. By waiting for the ICJ to rule in

LaGrand, the ILC was

waiting for additional foundation to base its expansion of remedies in the law
of state responsibility. The ICJ' s willingness to artificially bolster the ILC
position, while itself clearly relying on that institution' s legitimacy and work
takes the Court beyond appropriate processes and serves to validate any sus
picion that it was not empowered on its own to find such a remedy within
established law. The fact that the ICJ altered the borders of its powers so
substantially without providing sound legal justification heightens skepticism
surrounding the

LaGrand decision, as well as towards the inevitable judg

ments in the future which will require a high degree of legitimacy in both the
legal rule applied and in the institution applying it in order to ensure
compliance.
The court also ignores Koh ' s additional component-inducing compli
ance device, "norm internalization" through transnational legal process.
Under the Koh framework, the internalization of legal norms facilitated by an
established process by which international institutions and domestic institu
tions interact is key to compliance. The ICJ attempts to recast the ILC codi
fication process into a facade of sufficient input and ultimate transnational
adoption of AGNRs into established law. Under the transnational process
theory, AGNRs could become an acceptable international legal rule if their
adoption followed the traditional path that had begun with their consideration
by the ILC. They would have been considered, rejected or accepted as po
tential progressive development of international law by the commission and
then sent on for further elaboration and debate amongst states. States would
begin to further outline the proper boundaries by which such remedies would
operate and encourage adoption not only within international institutions, but
within the domestic legal sphere as well.

After such consideration, they

would eventually begin to display some of the characteristics ·of customary
international law and ultimately, be ripe for further recognition by the ICJ.
The fact that such deliberate decision making and adoption did not take place
means that the rule of forward-looking remedial structures such as AGNRs
have been unnaturally and undemocratically made part of international law.
Such unnatural occurrences are rarely respected as legitimate exercises of
law and power.
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The repercussions of ICJ legitimacy do not extend only vertically
amongst international and national institutions, but also horizontally amongst
international groups. The ICJ, in addition to voluntary compliance, depends
at least formally on the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly
for enforcement.

Legitimacy issues raised by artificial elevation of legal

norms by the ICJ further complicate practical obstacles of enforcement by
these branches. A nation like the United States, upon receiving an unfavora
ble judgment could, with justification, couch non-compliance with a ques
tionable rule in legitimacy terms and further might can graft its concerns of
legitimacy into non-compliance with more accepted legal norms. 1 49 These
compliance-circumventing justifications ultimately can be transferred domes
tically, resulting in reverse norm internalization. Such domestic skirting of
international laws indoctrinated into domestic systems cannot easily be con
tained to one area of law, but rather, is harmful to the entire international
system.
Legitimacy concerns go beyond institutional taint to include the contam
ination of the legal rule. AGNRs, legitimate in themselves, may suffer even

if legitimately adopted by other international organizations. Suspicion of the
inadequacy of past adoption could easily transfer to suspicion of current
processes of adoption by regional governance structures like the European
Union.

One reason behind this phenomenon is that illegitimate adoption

often signals unfairness in rule application. If it is considered necessary to
bypass normal processes that benefit compliance principles, parties often be
lieve that someone may be unfairly benefiting, even if this is not the case . 1 50

CONCLUSION
In this article I have demonstrated how the ILC in its Draft Articles on
State Responsibility and the ICJ in La,Grand attempt to bypass customary
international law by relying on the authority of each other. The ILC work on
Article 30 was designed to move away from state consent and domestic re
sponsibility in tailoring international obligations. Faced with the reality that
AGNRs lack both consistent state practice and opinio juris, but unwilling to
label them as progressive development, the ILC waited for ICJ adoption of

149

The latter justification is less persuasive, but is demonstrative of how the taint of illegitimacy

can go beyond a specific legal norm or principle into a broader concern of institutional legitimacy.

150 An example of this phenomenon is U.S. force in Kosovo. In that situation, the U.S. redefined
traditional rationalization for use of force after force had begun. Such hindsight justifications made
weaker states suspicious that the U.S. was looking for application beyond its Kosovo military opera·
tions. See Michael J. Glennon, Book Review: Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Intervention

ism After Kosovo, 96 AM. J. lm-'L. L. 489, 492 (2002).
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LaGrand. The ICJ did so while declining to exercise the

large scope of this new remedy, which kept the focus of the case on the death
penalty and provisional measures.
The ICJ's and ILC's surreptitious movement toward AGNRs resulted in
an illegitimate and artificial production of an international rule, which is both
bad public policy and which stains both the institutions and the principle. A
change in international law to a future-oriented approach empowered to in
terfere directly with domestic law redefines international court power under
the doubtful guise of custom. The effect of the policy, poor resource alloca
tion decided from afar with no legal basis, poor enforcement, and lack of
determinative guidelines is harmful. Even more concerning is the ripple ef
fect that such wide leaps of judicial activism, made possible by questionable
process, will have on international institutions and their relationships with
each other and domestic governance.

